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Executive Order 12,333: The
Permissibility of an American
Assassination of a Foreign
Leader
MACBETH. If it were done, when 'tis done, then 'twer well,
It were done quickly: If th'Assassination
Could trammell up the Consequence, and catch
With his surcease, Successe: that but this blow
Might be the be all, and the end all, heere,
But heere, upon this Banke and Schoole of time,
Wee'ld jumpe the life to come. But in these Cases,
We still have judgement heere, that we but teach
Bloody Instructions, which being taught, returne
To plague th'Inventer. This even-handed Justice
Commends th'Ingredience of our poyson'd Challice
To our owne lips.1
In the early fall of 1990, Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael
Dugan boasted that if war actually erupted between the United States
and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, American planes would probably target
Saddam, his family, and his mistress. When Secretary of Defense Rich-
ard Cheney learned of Dugan's boasting, he immediately fired him,
explaining to reporters that Dugan's comments constituted a potential
violation of the U.S. ban on assassinations. 2 Despite their impropriety,
General Dugan's comments raised a recurring question: Can the Presi-
dent order the assassination of a foreign leader?
Any discussion of assassination raises serious moral questions. Any
aversion to condoning assassination must be tempered by the realization
that in certain instances assassination can save lives. For example, Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln concluded that assassinating a leader is morally
justified when a people has suffered under a tyrant for an extended
period of time and has exhausted all legal and peaceful means of
ouster.3 German officials cited this "justifiable tyrannicide" rationale to
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 1, sc. 7, 1. 1-12 (Jay L. Halio ed., 1972)
[hereinafter MACBETH].
2. GeorgeJ. Church, Saddam in the Cross Hairs, TIME, Oct. 8, 1990, at 29.
3. Ernest W. LeFever, Death to Saddam Hussein? Let His Own People Decide, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at B7.
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defend a plot to assassinate Hitler during World War II.4 Commenta-
tors have argued that if the plot had succeeded, millions of lives would
have been saved. 5
Questions about assassination's legitimacy have played an integral
part in the political history of other nations, but Americans have acutely
felt the shadow of assassination both domestically and internationally.
Domestic assassinations, such as those of Abraham Lincoln, John F.
Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, as well as plots to assassinate foreign
leaders, such as Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo, and Ngo Dinh Diem,
have tainted the American political landscape for over two centuries.
Although many scholars have discussed assassination, few have
agreed upon a comprehensive definition of the term. 6 Nevertheless,
while no comprehensive definition of the term "assassination" exists
today, most would probably recognize an assassination when they see
one.7 Central Intelligence Agency plots to eliminate Cuba's Fidel
Castro and the recent efforts to bomb the personal compound of Libya's
Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi graphically exemplify the term
"assassination."
Though American awareness of assassination abroad may have
existed for hundreds of years, U.S. acknowledgment and condemnation
of such activities represents a recent development. Before any official
U.S. ban on assassinations existed, the United States supported a small
number of plots to kill foreign leaders. A Senate committee investigat-
ing and documenting these efforts concluded U.S. government officials
had perceived assassination as a permissible course of action.8
Responding to information provided by the Senate committee, Presi-
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The first reference to the word "assassination" in a Western language
occurred in Dante's Inferno--"lo perfido assassin," explained by a contemporary
commentator to mean "one who kills others for money." BERNARD LEwis, THE
ASSASSINS: A RADICAL SECT IN ISLAM 2 (1968). Modem definitions of "assassina-
tion" have varied widely. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 105 (5th ed. 1979) ("Murder
committed, usually, though not necessarily, for hire, without direct provocation or
cause of resentment given to the murderer by the person upon whom the crime is
committed; though an assassination of a public figure might be done by one acting
alone for personal, social or political reasons."). See also RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 124 (2d ed. 1976) (defining "assassinate" as "to kill sud-
denly, esp. a politically prominent person, murder premeditatedly and treacher-
ously"). Some scholars have declined to offer a definition, claiming "assassination"
can never comprehensively be defined. See, e.g., FRANKLIN L. FORD, POLITICAL MUR-
DER: FROM TYRANNICIDE TO TERRORISM 1, 46, 196, 301-307 (1985).
7. For purposes of this Note, the author adopts the following definition of assas-
sination: "The premeditated and intentional killing of a public figure accomplished
violently and treacherously for political means." This definition is presented with the
understanding that "assassination" cannot be comprehensively defined. For a dis-
cussion of the definition of assassination during wartime see, infra notes 105-19 and
accompanying text.
8. SELECT COMMITrEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING
FOREIGN LEADERS 7 (1976) [hereinafter ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS].
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dent Gerald Ford issued a 1976 executive order prohibiting any govern-
ment agency or employee from participating in or planning any
assassination.9 In subsequent years, Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald
Reagan, and George Bush have affirmed the order.' 0 The prohibition
on assassination is currently enshrined in Executive Order 12,333: "No
person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." 1 1
Although the ban on assassination contained in Executive Order
12,333 has the force and effect of a congressional statute,1 2 the Presi-
dent can evade the order's mandate and legally carry out the assassina-
tion of a foreign leader in four ways. He could:
(1) Ask Congress to declare war, in which case a foreign leader exer-
cising command responsibility would become a legitimate target;' 3
(2) Construe Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to permit the
assassination of a foreign leader based on either a right to self-defense or
a right to respond to criminal activities;' 4
(3) Narrowly interpret the order as not restricting the President as
long as he does not approve specific plans for the killing of individuals;' 5
or
(4) Overrule the order, create an exception to it, or permit the Con-
gress to do the same.16
By using any of these methods, a president could theoretically order the
assassination of a foreign leader without violating Executive Order
12,333.
This Note argues that the presence of these loopholes demands
effective correction and that Congress should pass a comprehensive stat-
ute banning all assassinations. Part I of this Note will trace the evolution
of the U.S. policy behind the ban on assassinations in Executive Order
12,333 and will briefly examine congressional attempts to enact legisla-
tion. In detailing the history of the prohibition on assassination, the sec-
tion will describe the conflict and cooperation between the executive
and legislative branches in this area of government policy. Part II will
discuss the constitutionality and legal effect of Executive Order 12,333.
Part III will analyze the four loopholes that enable a president to circum-
vent the ban imposed by the order. Part IV will analyze the four loop-
9. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
10. See Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3
C.F.R. 200 (1981). President Bush has not taken any action to alter or to rescind
Exec. Order No. 12,333.
11. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
12. Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 977 (1967) (explaining that where Congress delegates to the execu-
tive the authority to effectuate the provisions of a statute, such executive orders
issued pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law); see infra notes
77-79 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
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holes in light of the Persian Gulf War, examining the legality of an
American assassination of Saddam Hussein at various stages of the con-
flict. Part V will discuss the need for comprehensive congressional legis-
lation to prohibit assassination as a presidential policy option.
I. Background
A. The Early Assassination Efforts of the Executive Branch (1950-
1972)
1. The Senate Committee: U.S. Entanglement and Plausible Denial
In 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Opera-
tions with respect to Intelligence Activities ("Committee") convened to
investigate alleged U.S. involvement in assassination plots during the
1950s and 1960s. The Committee's investigative efforts focused on five
leaders in five separate foreign countries: Patrice Lumumba of the
Congo (currently Zaire), Fidel Castro of Cuba, Rafael Trujillo of the
Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and General
Rene Schneider of Chile.1 7 At the conclusion of its investigation, the
Committee directly implicated U.S. officials in attempted assassinations
of Castro and the assassination of Trujillo. In the three other incidents,
the Committee linked U.S. officials to events that occurred, but found no
direct evidence that U.S. officials had carried out assassinations or had
attempted assassinations. 18
In an introduction to its findings, the Committee made two initial
points: (1) the United States opposed the leaders in question and
(2) ambiguity about authorization for attempted assassinations existed
due to either a system of deniability or serious shortcomings in the
authorization scheme.' 9 As to the second point, the Committee
surmised either "plausible denial" had been accomplished or govern-
ment officials had engaged in assassination activity without proper
authorization. 20
The Committee defined "plausible denial" as a scheme where presi-
dential authorization is issued but intentionally obscured to shield the
President in the event of disclosure. 2 ' According to the Committee, the
original purpose of the "plausible denial" doctrine was to be able to
deny U.S. involvement in covert operations. 2 2 The Committee
explained that the doctrine was expanded to mask decisions of the Presi-
dent and senior staff members. As a result of the expansion, subordi-
nates failed fully to inform their superiors about their operations. In
addition, "plausible denial" encouraged the use of circumlocutions and
17. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS, supra note 8, at 4-5.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 6-7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 11-12.
22. Id.
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euphemism in instructions.23 While these techniques were designed to
enable the President and senior officials to deny knowledge of an opera-
tion should it be discovered, they also generated confusion regarding
the exact nature of the order given and of the action ultimately taken. 24
Such confusion was present in both incidents the Committee described
as directly involving U.S. officials.
2. The Attempted Assassination of Fidel Castro
The Committee directly linked U.S. officials to numerous attempts to
assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. The Committee found solid evidence
of at least eight C.I.A. plots to assassinate Castro from 1960 to 1965.
Though some plots stalled at the planning stage, one scheme involving
underworld figures twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills
and assassination teams to Cuba.25 The proposed assassination devices
for these eight plots included high-powered rifles, deadly bacterial
powders, poisoned cigars, poisoned pens, and "other devices which
strain the imagination."'2 6 Castro's evasive efforts and the C.I.A.'s
inability to recruit effective Cuban secret agents contributed to the fail-
ure of every attempted assassination.2 7 Although C.I.A. officials con-
tacted underworld figures in connection with assassination attempts on
Castro,28 the Committee concluded, perhaps on the basis of testimony
designed for "plausible denial" purposes, that neither President Eisen-
hower, President Kennedy, nor President Johnson was directly involved
in any attempt on Castro's life.
3. The Assassination of Rafael Trujillo
The Committee also directly linked U.S. officials to the assassination of
Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic. On May 30, 1961, a
group of prominent Dominican dissidents, some of high rank in national
life, assassinated Trujillo.2 9 According to the Committee, both the
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of
the brutal Trujillo regime by Dominican dissidents. Specifically, C.I.A.
23. Id. For example, the President or senior White House staffers might instruct
C.I.A. officials to address the insurrection in a certain country in "whatever manner
deemed appropriate." If the C.I.A. subsequently attempted to assassinate the insur-
rection's leader, and the press reported the attempt, the President and his or her
senior staff could effectively deny any knowledge of the particular methods used by
the C.I.A. and argue that such methods were unauthorized.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 71. Ironically, C.I.A. operatives and a Cuban official planned one of the
plots on November 22, 1963, the day on which President Kennedy was killed. Id. at
72.
26. Id. at 71. One such device was an "exotic seashell," rigged to explode and
deposited where Castro frequently went diving. Id. at 85. Another device was a div-
ing suit dusted inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease. Id. at
86.
27. See id. at 72-89.
28. See WARREN HINCKLE & WILLIAM W. TURNER, THE FISH Is RED: THE STORY OF
THE SECRET WAR AGAINST CASTRO 23-25 (1981).
29. MURRAY HAVENS ET AL., THE POLITICS OF ASSASSINATION 137 (1970).
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officials supplied three pistols and three carbines to the dissidents prior
to 1961.30 Although the United States knew the dissidents intended to
use the weapons to assassinate Trujillo, evidence failed to demonstrate
that the pistols and carbines supplied by the C.I.A. were actually used in
the assassination.3 1 Moreover, the Committee did not directly implicate
either Presidents Eisenhower or Kennedy in the ultimate assassination
of Trujillo.
The Committee's findings of direct U.S. involvement in assassina-
tion attempts on foreign leaders in the 1950s and 1960s generated sig-
nificant controversy. On Capitol Hill, distaste for the C.I.A.'s activities
began to grow. Commenting on the U.S. involvement in the assassina-
tion of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, and the
efforts of the executive branch to purge itself of primary responsibility,
Senator Daniel Moynihan recently echoed the understanding of many
critics:
We did not order it. We certainly did not do it. But we were around. I was
not then involved in foreign affairs, but I had friends who were. These
friends were sick at what we had done. Diem was an innocent man; an ally.
We had decided we needed a better one. Get out of the truck; say your
prayers. Something like that. I don't even want to look it up.3 2
30. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS, supra note 8, at 191.
31. Id.
32. Daniel P. Moynihan, Assassinations: Can't We Learn?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
1989, at A35 (editorial). Although the Committee believed that Diem's assassination
was a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals angered by his refusal to resign dur-
ing a coup, it found prior U.S. involvement in discussions regarding an assassination
attempt. ALLEGED AsSASSINATION PLOTS, supra note 8, at 217. At one point, the Sai-
gon Chief of Station recommended that the United States "not set ourselves irrevo-
cably against the assassination plot." Id. After setting the fatal coup in motion and
offering aid to the dissident generals despite the possibility of assassination, the
United States attempted to distance itself from the affair with cables and conversa-
tions condemning harm to Diem. Although the Committee eventually absolved U.S.
officials of direct responsibility for Diem's death, one could perceive the sudden
change of heart by the United States regarding harm to Diem as one more effort at
"plausible denial." Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
The Committee found indirect involvement of U.S. officials in the assassinations of
both Patrice Lumumba of the Congo and Chilean General Rene Schneider. Regard-
ing the assassination of Lumumba, the Committee discovered that in the summer of
1960, the C.I.A. Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, asked the Chief of the
African Division, Bronson Tweedy, to explore the feasibility of assassinating
Lumumba, Congo's prime minister. Bissell also asked a C.I.A. scientist, Joseph
Scheider, to prepare to assassinate or incapacitate an unidentified "African leader."
Scheider testified that Bissell said that the assignment had the "highest authority."
In late September, Scheider delivered a lethal toxin to the Station Officer and
ordered him to assassinate Lumumba. After being assured that President Dwight
Eisenhower had ordered the assassination, the Station Officer took "exploratory
steps" pursuant to the assassination plot. Both before and after these steps were
taken, cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba were sent to the Congo through
an extraordinarily restricted "eyes only" channel, two of which C.I.A. Director Allen
Dulles personally signed. Id. at 19. Ultimately, the Congo central government
turned against Lumumba and transported him directly into the hands of his enemies
who killed him. Id. at 48. Although the C.I.A. Congo Station knew of the central
406 Vol. 25
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B. The Response of the Executive Branch to the Public Disclosure of
Past Assassination Efforts (1972-1975)
After press reports that the C.I.A. had engaged in assassinations of for-
eign leaders-allegations later confirmed by the Committee's investiga-
tions-C.I.A. Director Richard Helms issued the first of several agency
directives prohibiting assassination activities in the intelligence commu-
nity. In a memorandum to his deputy directors on March 6, 1972,
Helms stated:
It has recently again been alleged in the press that the C.I.A. engages in
assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency
policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, however, I direct
that no such activity or operations be undertaken, assisted or suggested
by any of our personnel. 33
Helms's successor, William Colby, reaffirmed the C.I.A. ban on assassi-
nations on August 29, 1973 in one of a series of orders generated from
an internal review of prior "questionable activities."'3 4 The order stated,
"the C.I.A. will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest
to others that assassination be employed." 3 5 Colby's ban was expressly
endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, who had
uncovered more detailed information regarding several alleged assassi-
nation plots occurring in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 3 6
Presidents did not become involved in the controversy over an
assassination ban until February 1975. At that time, President Ford,
commenting on the Senate Committee's recently initiated investigations
into the alleged assassination plots by the C.I.A., warned associates that
if the investigations went too far they could expose several assassina-
government's plan to transport Lumumba to his death, the Committee concluded no
basis existed for linking the United States to the fatal transport. Id. at 49.
The Committee's final revelation involved the attempted kidnapping and allegedly
accidental assassination of Chilean General Rene Scheider. On September 15, 1970,
President Richard Nixon told C.I.A. Director Richard Helms that the new govern-
ment in Chile headed by Dr. Salvadore Allende Gossens was unacceptable to the
United States. Nixon ordered Helms to take a direct role in organizing a military
coup d'etat in Chile. The Chilean commander-in-chief, General Rene Scheider,
became a major obstacle to the coup plans when he insisted that the constitutional
electoral process be followed. Id. at xxv. After two abduction attempts of Scheider
had failed, the C.I.A., acting under instructions from President Nixon and fully aware
that lives, including Scheider's, might be risked, supplied Chilean coup leaders with
three submachine guns and ammunition. In a third kidnap attempt, kidnappers acci-
dentally shot and killed Scheider. Id. at 226. Although the Committee concluded
that the third set of kidnappers was not made up of the same individuals to whom the
C.I.A. had supplied the weapons, it did not clarify whether or not these killers were
either supported or encouraged by anyone connected with the C.I.A. While Henry
Kissinger and General Alexander Haig denied that the White House had any knowl-
edge of the activities in Chile after October 15, 1970, C.I.A. officials insisted that they
were acting on Presidential authority. Id. at xxv.
33. ALLEGED AsSASSINATION PLOTS, supra note 8, at 282.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Ford Said to Fear Baring of C.LA. Role in Assassinations Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 1975, at A30.
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tions of foreign officials in which intelligence agencies were involved.
President Ford referred to the occurrence of these assassinations, the
New York Times reported, as a "reason for extreme caution and security
in the investigations of the C.I.A. by the Administration and
Congress." 3 7
President Ford publicly condemned assassination efforts by the
C.I.A. on many occasions. At a March 17, 1975 news conference, Ford
stated, "let me say at the outset that this Administration does not con-
done, under any circumstances, any assassination attempts. We in this
Administration will not participate under any circumstances in activities
of that sort."'38 In a November 26, 1975 news conference at the White
House, Ford further stated, "I have issued specific instructions to the
U.S. intelligence agencies that under no circumstances should any
agency in this Government, while I am President, participate in or plan
for any assassination of a foreign leader."3 9
While President Ford publicly expressed outrage over the alleged
C.I.A. assassination plots and called for thorough investigations, the
views he expressed to Congress were seemingly different. In a letter to
the Senate Committee investigating the assassination allegations, Ford
urged the members not to make public the report of their findings.
While reiterating his abhorrence of assassination as a policy option,
Ford pleaded with the Committee's members to seal their report,
saying:
Public release of these official materials and information will do grievous
damage to our country. It would likely be exploited by foreign nations
and groups hostile to the United States in a manner designed to do maxi-
mum damage to the reputation and foreign policy of the United States. It
would seriously impair our ability to exercise a positive leading role in
world affairs.40
Ford's final word on assassination was to impose the first presiden-
tial ban on assassination activities within the government. In January
1976, Congress became shrouded in controversy when the Committee's
report was leaked to the press.4 1 Reacting to public disclosure in Febru-
ary of 1976, President Ford handed down Executive Order 11,905.42
The order included a prohibition against assassination, stating: "No
37. Id.
38. President's News Conference at South Bend, Indiana, 1975 PUB. PAPERS 361,
363 (Mar. 17, 1975).
39. President's News Conference at the White House, 1975 PUB. PAPERS 1902,
1905, 1914 (Nov. 26, 1975).
40. Letter to the Chairman and Members of the Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975 PUB.
PAPERS 1805, 1805-1807 (Oct. 31, 1975).
41. Leslie Gelb, Spy Inquiries Begun Amid Public Outrage, End in Indifference, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1976, at A20.
42. Joel L. Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presiden-
tial Legislation, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 1, 38-39. Although Execu-
tive Order No. 11,905 included the ban on assassination, it did not contain language
describing either the purpose or the scope of the ban.
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employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire
to engage in, political assassination." 43
Subsequent presidents have affirmed President Ford's ban on assas-
sination. In January 1978, President Carter expanded the ban to pro-
hibit assassinations conducted by individuals working for the United
States. "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United
States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassina-
tion." 4 4 In December 1981, President Reagan adopted the same lan-
guage used by President Carter.4 5 President George Bush has
seemingly affirmed Reagan's prohibition by allowing Executive Order
12,333 to remain in effect.
C. The Failure of Congress to Legislate a Ban on Assassinations
(1975-present)
At the conclusion of its investigations, the Senate Committee exam-
ining alleged C.I.A. assassination plots condemned assassination and
rejected it as an instrument of American policy. Citing moral and practi-
cal considerations, 46 the Committee concluded that "a flat ban against
assassination should be written into law."' 4 7 It expressed surprise that
no statute had outlawed assassinating a foreign official48 and strongly
recommended the "prompt enactment of a statute making it a federal
crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so."' 49
The Committee argued that a statute, as opposed to an executive order
or a C.I.A. directive, was needed because "[1]aws express our nation's
values; they deter those who might be tempted to ignore those values
and stiffen the will of those who want to resist the temptation." 50 More-
over, a statute would be less vulnerable to rapid policy transitions
caused by wholesale changes in the executive branch. 5 1
Despite the Committee's clear directive, Congress has repeatedly
failed to enact a ban on assassinations. In September 1976, Republican
Representative Robert N. McClory introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives providing, "[w]hoever, except in time of war, while
engaged in the duties of an intelligence operation of the Government of
the United States, willfully kills any person shall be imprisoned for not
43. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
44. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978).
45. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
46. The Committee cited numerous witnesses who denounced assassination as an
immoral tactic for any nation. Moreover, the Committee cited former C.I.A. Director
Richard Helms's contentions that the inability to keep attempted assassinations
secret in a democracy and the uncertainty over who will replace an assassinated
leader make assassination an ineffective tactic. ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS, supra
note 8, at 281-82.
47. Id. at 281.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 282-83.
51. Id.
409
Cornell International Law Journal
less than one year."' 52 Although the House referred the bill jointly to
the Committees on Armed Services and the Judiciary, Congress did not
enact it into law.
In May of 1977, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence fur-
ther fueled the congressional initiative towards legislating a ban on
assassinations by calling for stringent legislative measures to avoid the
repetition of the "widespread abuses of the past."5 3 The Select Com-
mittee indicated it was considering prohibition of some clandestine
activities, including assassination. 54
Encouraged by the Select Committee's enthusiasm for a legislative
ban against assassination, twenty senators introduced a bill containing
an expansive prohibition against assassinations.5 5 The bill prohibited
any individual from conspiring to assassinate any foreign official and lev-
ied a punishment of "imprisonment for any term of years or life."'56 In
addition, any officer or employee of the United States, while outside
U.S. territory, who conspired, attempted to assassinate, or assassinated a
foreign official would be punished by imprisonment for any term of
years or life.5 7 Although the Senate referred the bill to the Select Com-
52. H.R. 15542, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 9(1) (1976).
53. Anthony Marro, Intelligence Abuses Curbed, Panel Says, N.Y. TiMEs, May 19,
1977, at A17.
54. Id.
55. S. 2525, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978). The sponsors of the bill included,
inter alia: Sens. Goldwater, Byrd, Baker, Biden, Hart, Lugar, Moynihan, and
Cranston.
56. Id § 134(5). Officers or employees found guilty of first-degree murder would
be sentenced to life imprisonment automatically. Id.
57.
Whoever being an officer or employee of the United States, while outside
the United States and the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, conspires with any other person or persons to kill any foreign
official, because of such official's office or position, or because of such offi-
cial's political views, actions, or statements, while such official is outside the
United States and such jurisdiction, and one or more such officers, employ-
ees, or other persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or life.
Id.
Whoever being an officer or employee of the United States, while outside
the United States and the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, attempts to kill any foreign official, because of such official's
office or position, or because of such official's political views, actions, or
statements, while such official is outside the United States and such jurisdic-
tion, shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or life.
Id.
Whoever being an officer or employee of the United States, while outside
the United States and the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, kills any foreign official, because of such official's office or
position, or because of such official's political views, actions, or statements,
while such official is outside the United States and such jurisdiction, shall be
punished by imprisonment for any term of years or life, except that any such
officer or employee who is found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life.
Vol. 25
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mittee on Intelligence, Congress failed to enact it into law.
A final congressional effort to prohibit assassinations occurred in
February of 1980. Members of both the House and Senate introduced
bills copying the prohibitive language in President Carter's executive
order: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States
Government shall engage or conspire to engage in assassination." 5 8
The House and the Senate referred the bills to their respective Select
Committees on Intelligence. Although Congress initially appeared to
favor the bills, interest dissipated in late spring 1980. Ultimately, the
Senate bill's proposed code of reform, which included a prohibition on
assassinations, was abandoned in favor of a shorter version giving the
C.I.A. more latitude to undertake covert operations.5 9 Critics cited the
Iran hostage crisis, the Afghanistan situation after intervention by the
Soviet Union, and President Carter's "luke-warm support" of the Senate
measure as reasons that Congress did not pass the proposed ban on
assassination. 60
Commentators have offered four explanations for Congress's fail-
ure to legislate a ban on assassinations. First, the public never fully sup-
ported a ban.6 ' Congressmen reported that from the beginning of the
Committee's investigation, the issue of C.I.A. political assassinations
"never caught fire among their constituents."'6 2 Without pressure from
constituents, members of Congress had little impetus to act.63 Repre-
sentative Otis G. Pike, the chairman of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence, offered a similar explanation, "It all lasted too long, and
the media, the Congress, and the people lost interest." 64
Second, commentators suggest that the Senate Committee may
have allowed public interest in the assassination issue to wane.65 One
commentator argued, "[t]he Committee was unwilling from the begin-
ning to operate in public or to confront and do battle with intelligence
agencies that were reluctant to supply full and complete information."'66
By deliberately trying to avert public attention from intelligence agen-
cies, the Committee may have contributed to the failure of legislative
58. H.R. 6588, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 131 (1980); S. 2284, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 131 (1980).
59. Charles Hohr, Effort to Enact Intelligence Charter Is Abandoned by Senate Advocates,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1980, at Al. The shorter legislation failed to address two issues
other than assassination that were of concern to critics: (1) The legislation did not
mention the use ofjournalists, clergymen, and professors or the use of their institu-
tions as "cover" for C.I.A. agents; (2) The legislation inhibited scrutiny of the intelli-
gence community by making it a crime, punishable by jail sentences of five to ten
years and fines of up to $50,000, for an official or former official of the Government
to disclose the identity of an intelligence agent. Id.
60. Id.
61. Nicholas M. Horrock, The Meaning of Congressional Intelligence Inquiries, N.Y.
TMES, Apr. 30, 1976, at A20.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Gelb, supra note 41, at A20.
65. Horrock, supra note 61, at A20.
66. Id.
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reform efforts.6 7 In addition, the Committee's unintentional disclosure
of classified information resulting in a lead C.I.A. officer's assassination
put Congress on the defensive in late 1975 and early 1976.68 Thus,
Congress grew increasingly reluctant to draw attention to intelligence
activities by attempting reform.
Third, the House and Senate Committees to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities approached their
investigations differently.6 9 While the House Committee angered
House colleagues by operating openly, the Senate Committee made
numerous deals with the White House, the New York Times reported. 70
These divergent approaches fostered negative reactions to the idea of a
legislative ban on assassinations in both chambers of Congress. Senate
leaders were angered by the House Committee's overt investigation
strategy, and House members were upset by the Senate Committee's
secret interactions with the White House. 7 1 Ultimately, these negative
reactions prevented establishment of a unified coalition supporting a
ban.7 2
Finally, the difficulties of securing information about the intelli-
gence community's inner workings hampered the congressional investi-
gations of the mid-1970s. 73 Members of the executive branch
perpetuated such difficulties. For example, according to the New York
Times, Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller lectured C.I.A. Director Wil-
liam Colby for giving too much information to an investigative commis-
sion that Rockefeller himself chaired. 74
Although the Senate Committee recommended that Congress enact
"a flat ban against assassinations" into law, Congress has repeatedly
failed to carry out that recommendation. Low constituent interest in an
assassination ban, intense wrangling within Congress, and blunt White
House and C.I.A. refusals to provide necessary information have con-
tributed to Congress's failure. Because of Congress's inability to legis-
late a detailed prohibition on assassination, the vague and simplistic
language of Executive Order 12,333 persists as the only legal bar to a
recurrence of the executive branch's assassination exploits of the 1950s
and 1960s.
67. Id.
68. Gelb, supra note 41, at A20. News reports alleged that Daniel Schorr, a CBS
reporter, obtained and arranged for publication of the classified report of the House
Committee's investigation of the alleged assassination plots. After a magazine pub-
lished a portion of the report identifying Richard S. Welch as the head of the C.I.A.
office in Greece, unknown individuals assassinated Welch. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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II. Constitutionality and Legal Effect of Executive Order 12,333
Although congressional efforts to ban assassination have failed, the
presidential prohibition still exists in Executive Order 12,333. How-
ever, executive orders may raise issues about the legitimacy of presiden-
tial lawmaking, because lawmaking is essentially a legislative function.
Consequently, the current ban on assassination raises numerous ques-
tions regarding the constitutionality and legal effect of executive orders.
By merely prohibiting assassinations via executive order, a presi-
dent is essentially performing a legislative function. He is creating
"presidential legislation" that may be unconstitutional. 75 In Youngstown
Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court delineated a clear test to assess the
constitutionality of an executive order: "The President's power, if any,
to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."7 6 Unless the President can cite either statutory or
constitutional authority for his actions, the order will be held
unconstitutional.
In applying the Youngstown test, courts have upheld most executive
orders as constitutional exercises of delegated congressional author-
ity.7 7 For example, in Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., the court con-
cluded that because the provisions of the executive order in question
were related to the purposes of the congressional statute authorizing
presidential action, "[t]hat Order ... is to be accorded the force and
effect given to a statute enacted by Congress."7 8 Similar deference has
been given to presidents issuing executive orders in other cases.7 9 Nev-
75. John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59
TEx. L. REv. 837, 839 (1981).
76. Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (holding that, when
neither Article II of the Constitution nor the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 authorized the
President to direct the seizure of steel mills, an executive order authorizing such
seizure by Secretary of Commerce was unconstitutional). In Youngstown, the Presi-
dent's executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate
most of the striking steel mills was not based upon any specific statutory authority but
rather based generally upon all powers vested in the President by the Constitution
and by laws of the United States. After the President promptly reported to Congress
that the Secretary had issued an order seizing the steel mills and directing their presi-
dents to operate them as operating managers for the U.S. in accordance with his
regulations and directions, Congress took no action. Congress had provided other
methods of dealing with such situations and refused to authorize governmental
seizures of property to settle labor disputes. Based on the clear and intentional
absence of congressional authorization for the order, the Supreme Court held the
order unconstitutional. Id. at 579.
77. Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 42, at 5.
78. Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) (while rejecting claim of former employee of government
contractor against employer for violation of employee's rights under executive order
forbidding discrimination because of national origin, court held that executive order
of the President, where constitutional, is given the force and effect of a congressional
statute).
79. See, e.g., Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1964) (execu-
tive orders requiring non-discrimination provisions in government contracts have the
force of law);J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (Tariff
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ertheless, some commentators have criticized this judicial deference to
the President.80 One critic has asserted that when executive orders have
lacked statutory authority, courts have manufactured it for presidents.8 1
Other critics maintain that when Congress delegates broad power to the
executive branch, presidents lack adequate standards to govern their
conduct.8 2 As a result, presidents may issue executive orders without a
clear statutory basis and, therefore, do violence to the principle of sepa-
ration of powers in the American constitutional framework.8 3 Such
abuses can be remedied only through heightened judicial scrutiny of
executive order legality.
Despite the calls for heightened judicial scrutiny of executive
orders,8 4 the Supreme Court has shown broad deference to the Presi-
dent by actively seeking congressional authorization for executive
orders pertaining to national security. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,85 for
example, the Court acknowledged the absence of explicit congressional
authorization for an executive order dealing with national security, but
the Court nevertheless declared it constitutionally valid:
Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not,
"especially... in the areas of foreign policy and national security," imply
"congressional disapproval" of action taken by the Executive .... On the
contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of
the President's authority in a particular case which evinces legislative
intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to
"invite" 'measures on independent presidential responsibility." 86
Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan cited the President's constitutional
power as sufficient authority for executive orders banning assassina-
tions.8 7 Commentators have pointed out four sections generally used to
Act empowering President to increase or decrease duties according to certain criteria
not unconstitutional delegation of power).
80. See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 75, at 843.
81. Id.
82. Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 42, at 5-6.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEw 131-34 (1980); Paul Gerwitz, The Courts, Congress and Executive Policy Making:
Notes on Three Doctrines, LAW & CoNrEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46.
85. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
86. Id. at 678 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981), and Youngstown
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
87. "By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of
the United States, including the National Security Act of 1947 ... and as President of
the United States of America, it is hereby ordered ...." Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3
C.F.R. 90 (1976) (preamble); "By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Consti-
tution and statutes of the United States of America including the National Security
Act of 1947... and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide
for the organization and control of United States foreign intelligence activities, it is
hereby ordered, ... " Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978) (preamble); "[B]y
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United
States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947... and as President of
the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United
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authorize executive orders: 88 (1) Article II, Section 1, vesting executive
power in the President;8 9 (2) Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause; 90 (3) Article II, Section 3, the Faithful Execu-
tion or "Take Care" Clause;9 1 and (4) the designation of the President
as "exclusively responsible for the conduct of diplomatic and foreign
affairs."'9 2 Courts have expressly recognized these sections as providing
sufficient constitutional authorization for executive orders.93
In addition to constitutional authority, the executive orders banning
assassination have cited the National Security Act of 1947 as congres-
sional authorization for the prohibition.9 4 The National Security Act of
States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby
ordered .... " Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981) (preamble).
88. Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 42, at 11-13.
89. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
90. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. cl. 1.
91. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State
of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such Time as he shall think proper, he shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers, he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,
and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
92. See Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 42, at 11-13. See also United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
93. Article II, section 1, has been successfully cited by presidents to justify execu-
tive orders without congressional authorization as well as executive privilege. See
Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952); Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege
v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REv. 104 (1965). The Commander-in-Chief
Clause was used to legitimate constitutionally President Franklin Roosevelt's intern-
ment of Japanese Americans. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85-86
(1943). Repeated judicial recognition of the legitimate authorization provided to the
President by the "Take Care" Clause encouraged the Solicitor General in Youngstown
to argue that the clause provided authority for the presidential seizure of the steel
mills. Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 42, at 12 n.83. Finally, the fact that the Presi-
dent is exclusively responsible for diplomatic and foreign affairs was held sufficient
authorization for Franklin Roosevelt's order forbidding arms shipments to Paraguay
and Bolivia in 1932. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304
(1936).
94. "By virtue of the authority vested in me... including the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended . . ." Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976). "By
virtue of the authority vested in me ... including the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended . . ." Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978). "[B]y virtue of the
authority vested in me ... including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended
... " Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
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1947 ("Act")9 5 establishes the President as the head of the National
Security Council (NSC).9 6 The NSC's function is "to advise the Presi-
dent with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military serv-
ices and the other departments and agencies of the Government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."19 7
The Act gives the President authority to direct the NSC "for the purpose
of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security"
and allows the NSC, under the direction of the President, "to consider
policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies
of the Government concerned with the national security."9 8 By giving
the President the authority to direct the NSC, the Act appears to be leg-
islation "closely related to the question of the President's authority...
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discre-
tion" under Dames & Moore.9 9 The broad deference generally given to
executive orders, in conjunction with the constitutional provisions and
statutory authority cited by the three presidents, suggests that sufficient
authority exists to satisfy the Youngstown test. Thus, although the courts
have not explicitly spoken on this authority's constitutional sufficiency, it
is likely the executive orders banning assassination would survive a con-
stitutional challenge.' 0 0
Besides the challenge posed by judicial scrutiny, executive orders
are vulnerable to two other direct attacks. First, Congress may invalidate
or repeal executive orders when it believes that the executive branch has
incorrectly interpreted its statutes.' 0 1 Second, the President may alter
the order by issuing a new one. 10 2
As long as executive orders pass constitutional muster and are not
repealed or amended by Congress or the President, they have the force
and effect of law.10 3 Executive Order 12,333 does not pose constitu-
tional problems under Youngstown or its progeny, 10 4 and it has not been
repealed or amended by Congress or the President. Therefore, Execu-
95. National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 401-432 (1992).
96. Id. § 402(a).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 402(b).
99. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981).
100. Although a court would probably uphold the order under the minimal scru-
tiny applied under the Youngstown test, there is still strong reason to question the
legitimacy of such a holding. Since executive orders do not require the approval of
Congress, they are effective presidential tools for producing legislation that evades
the bicameral Constitutional process. Executive orders can be issued in far less time
and are subject to far less public scrutiny than Congressional legislation. Noyes, supra
note 75, at 839. The Court's application of limited scrutiny to presidential lawmak-
ing threatens the Constitutional notion of separation of powers and, as a result, is
troubling.
101. Noyes, supra note 75, at 846.
102. Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 42, at 38.
103. Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967).
104. See supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
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tive Order 12,333 should have the force and effect of law. Nevertheless,
the President might circumvent the Order's ban and assassinate a for-
eign leader as a result of certain "loopholes" in the Order, described in
the next Section of this Note.
mH. Analysis: Four Methods Available to Circumvent the Ban on
Assassinations
A president can evade the ban on assassinations posed by Executive
Order 12,333 through four loopholes. He may: (1) declare open war;
(2) broadly construe Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and inter-
pret certain criminal acts as legitimating self-defense; (3) narrowly con-
strue Executive Order 12,333; and (4) repeal or amend the order, or
permit Congress to do the same.
A. Declaration of War
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way
to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might
imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a
fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the
mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.
Carl Von Clausewitz 1° 5
During peacetime, citizens of a nation are entitled to immunity from
international acts of violence by citizens or military forces of other
nations under the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) of the Charter
provides:
All Member States shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations. 10 6
During wartime, however, the same protection does not exist. Through-
out history, the law of war has recognized killing the enemy, whether
lawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents, as legitimate. In 1625,
for example, Grotius recognized that 'just as anyone is permitted to
seize the property of an enemy, so also ... it is permissible to kill an
enemy."1 0 7
In the mid-twentieth century, Oppenheim echoed Grotius and went
even further to condone assassination itself:
Every combatant may be killed or wounded, whether a private soldier or
an officer, or even the monarch or a member of his family. Some writers
105. CARL VON CLAusEwrrz, ON WAR 75 (1976).
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), para. 4.
107. HuGo GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 788 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
1925) (book III, chap. XVIII, § 1(2) (1646)). Proposed bill S. 2525 also recognized
the legality of assassination during times of war by establishing an exception to its
proposed ban "during any period of war declared by the Congress against another
country...." S. 2525, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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assert that it is a usage of warfare not to aim at a sovereign or a member
of his family. There is in strict law no rule preventing the killing and
wounding of such persons. 10 8
When war breaks out, as a result of congressional declaration or
presidential initiative, both sides usually acknowledge as legitimate the
killing of enemy combatants. Nevertheless, the President's ability to
assassinate foreign officials is limited. Such a limit was first delineated in
1863 in the U.S. Army's General Orders:
Assassination. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an indi-
vidual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hos-
tile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor,
any more than the modem law of peace allows such international out-
lawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. 0 9
This limit on wartime assassinations was extended internationally by the
Hague Convention of 1907. "The rights of belligerents to adopt means
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited... [I]t is especially forbidden...
[t]o kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army." "0 More recently, a 1956 U.S. Army Field Manual con-
strued these two articles as "prohibiting assassination, proscription, or
outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well
as offering a reward for an enemy 'dead or alive.' " I I
While the military's interpretation of the Hague Convention sub-
stantially curtails the availability of wartime assassination, some com-
mentators argue for a less restrictive construction. For example,
Spaight writes:
Treachery must be clearly distinguished from "dashes made at a ruler or
commander by an individual or a little band of individuals who come as
open enemies." The latter do no wrong under the laws of war . ..
[T]reachery "must not be confounded with surprises, stratagems, or
ambushes, which are allowable." 112
The recent revision to the U.S. Army Field Manual, Section 27-10,
reflects a similar interpretation: "[The Hague Convention's prohibition
on assassination] does not.., preclude attacks on individual soldiers or
officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied terri-
tory, or elsewhere."' 13 This section's annotations state that the revi-
sion's purpose was "not to foreclose activity by resistance movements,
108. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE 338 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
7th ed. 1952).
109. U.S. Army General Orders No. 100, 148, reprinted in W. Hays Parks, Memo-
randum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination, ARMY LAWYER, Dec. 1989
(Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-204), at 5.
110. Hague Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1917, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, Annex to the Hague Regu-
lations, arts. 22 and 23(b) [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1907].
11l. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL 27-10,
para. 31 (1956) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 27-10].
112. J. M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 87 (1911).
113. Parks, supra note 109, at 5.
Vol. 25
1992 Assassination of Foreign Leaders
paratroops, and other belligerents who may attack individual
persons.", 14
A recent military legal analysis of wartime assassination interpreted
"treacherous" in relation to specific wartime killings. The author con-
cluded that none of the following acts constituted assassination under
Executive Order 12,333: (1) the November 18, 1941 raid by Scottish
commandos at Bedda Littoria, Libya to kill German Field Marshal Erwin
Rommel; (2) the April 18, 1943 interception and downing of a Japanese
aircraft carrying Admiral Osoruku Yamamoto by a U.S. Air Force jet
fighter; and (3) the October 30, 1951 airstrike by the U.S. Navy that
killed 500 senior Chinese and North Korean military officers and secur-
ity forces at a military planning conference at Kapsan, North Korea. 51
Thus, while "treacherous" attacks on foreign leaders are prohibited,
U.S. military law apparently permits a wide range of wartime killings of
foreign military officials.
Although U.S. military interpretations of the Hague Convention
appear to permit wartime assassination of military leaders, the legality of
killing civilian leaders is less clear. Some commentators conclude that a
civilian death "ancillary to the lawful attack of a military objective is
neither assassination nor otherwise unlawful." 16 Under this view, civil-
ians "in close proximity to a military objective assume a certain risk
through their mere proximity."' "17 Moreover, although war experts also
agree that civilians who participate in hostilities can be treated as com-
batants, there is no consensus on what degree of participation makes an
individual civilian a combatant. Experts do agree, however, that a civil-
ian head of state serving as commander-in-chief of the armed forces dur-
ing wartime may be assassinated."18
Current U.S. military interpretations of the Hague Convention limit
wartime killing. Military law prohibits both the killing of non-participant
civilians and putting a price on an enemy's head.' 19 Yet the descriptions
of these restrictions on wartime assassination are far from precise. The
term "assassination" is never defined, and the prohibitions against "put-
ting a price upon an enemy's head" and "offering a reward for an enemy
'dead or alive'" are underinclusive in covering the breadth of wartime
activities. The inadequacy of the delineation of parameters of possible
wartime assassinations renders exceptions to the ban on assassination
both morally and legally suspect. Without a sufficient explanation of the
scope and nature of exceptions, military officials may abusively interpret
them, justifying a plethora of assassination efforts.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 6 n.4.
119. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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B. Right of Self-Defense Short of War: Broad Construction of
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
No matter how high the aims predicated by terrorists (and often there are
no such justifications), their activities are always criminal, always destruc-
tive, throwing humankind back to a time of lawlessness and chaos, pro-
voking (perhaps with the help of the secret services of foreign
governments) internal and international complications, contradicting the
goals of peace and progress.
Andr6 Sakharov1 20
Under Executive Order 12,333, it may be permissible for the United
States to assassinate a foreign leader in certain situations falling short of
actual war.1 2 1 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter suggests the possibility of
justified peacetime assassinations. Recognizing the inherent right of
nations to defend themselves, Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. 122
The U.S. interpretation of Article 51 recognizes three general forms of
self-defense: (1) self-defense against an actual use of force or hostile
act; (2) preemptive self-defense against an imminent use of force; and
(3) self-defense against a continuing threat. 123 Presidents use these
forms of self-defense to authorize assassination in two situations:
(1) when another nation breaches its international duty to protect
Americans from acts of violence originating in or launched from its sov-
ereign territory and (2) when a nation aids and abets international crim-
inal activities, including terrorism. 12 4
Recently, the United States justified an assassination attempt on the
life of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya by citing Qaddafi's inter-
national criminal activity. 25 Just before the 1986 assassination attempt,
the Reagan Administration articulated a possible exception to Executive
Order 12,333's ban on assassination in the context of legitimate
responses to international terrorism.1 26 Specifically, the Reagan
120. Saklarov Speaks Out From Exile, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1980, at Cl.
121. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
122. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
123. Parks, supra note 109, at 7.
124. Id. Examples of these two applications are as follows: (1) 1804-1805, when
Marine First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon led an expedition into Libya to capture or
kill the Barbary pirates; (2) 1916, when General "Blackjack" Pershing led a year-long
effort into Mexico to capture or kill Pancho Villa, a Mexican bandit who had recently
attacked Columbus, New Mexico; (3) 1928-1932, when U.S. Marines tried to capture
or kill the Nicaraguan bandit leader Augusto Cesar Sandino; and (4) 1967, when
U.S. Army personnel assisted the Bolivian army in its efforts to capture or kill
Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Id.
125. See infra notes 132-33.
126. Doyle McManus, Assassination Ban May Not Apply in Anti-Terror Raids, L.A.
TIMES, July 13, 1985, at Al.
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Administration publicly considered "whether to exempt punitive raids
against terrorists from its policy against assassinations." 12 7 In seem-
ingly circular rhetoric, the Administration described the proposed "clar-
ification" of the ban on assassination as "not intended as a prelude to
sending U.S. 'hit teams' in pursuit of suspected [terrorists]," but rather
"aimed largely at eliminating the argument that any military action
against terrorist leaders would violate the presidential ban on assassina-
tions."'128 While most Reagan Administration officials downplayed the
proposed exception to the assassination ban, Secretary of State George
Schultz called for an expansive loophole and complained publicly that
the United States was becoming "the Hamlet of nations, worrying end-
lessly over whether and how to respond."' 29
Any uncertainty connected with the Reagan Administration's possi-
ble exception was eliminated, however, by the 1986 bombing of Qad-
dafi's personal quarters in Libya. According to reporter Seymour M.
Hersh, nine of the eighteen American fighter jets that flew to Tripoli on
April 14, 1986 had a specific mission to target Qaddafi and his family. 3 0
After three months of interviewing more than seventy current and for-
mer officials in the White House, the State Department, the C.I.A., the
National Security Agency, and the Pentagon, Hersh concluded that Qad-
dafi's assassination was the primary goal of the Libyan bombing.'
3 1
One well-informed Air Force intelligence officer stated, "[t]here's no
question they were looking for Qaddafi. It was briefed that way. They
were going to kill him."
1 3 2
127. Id.
128. Id. at A14.
129. Id.
130. Seymour M. Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987 (magazine), at
17.
131. Id. at 17-19.
132. Id. at 20. Although U.S. intelligence planners resolved to assassinate Qaddafi
early on, President Reagan was reluctant to act until he had conclusive evidence link-
ing Qaddafi to terrorist activities. On April 5, 1986, the National Security Agency
intercepted messages from Tripoli to East Germany which appeared to link Libya
with the 1986 bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Germany. Although the
messages appeared to provide a link, many Reagan Administration officials doubted
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these messages as "irrefutable" evidence that Libya was behind the bombing was
immediately challenged by allied nations, especially West Germany. Id. at 19. Subse-
quently, National Security Agency officials continued to express doubts about the
credibility of the White House's claims. Id.
Undaunted by these concerns, President Reagan quickly perceived the messages as
sufficient authorization for a U.S. attack on Qaddafi. After rejecting a scheme pro-
posed by Colonel Oliver North in which a covert Navy S.E.A.L. team would surface
on the beach near Qaddafi's personal tent and set up a laser beam to guide American
bombs directly at the main targets, President Reagan authorized the use of a team of
Air Force F-i l's. Id. at 84. On April 14, 1986, the United States, assisted by Israeli
intelligence, attacked Qaddafi's personal quarters. In the hours immediately follow-
ing the raid, false optimism about the success of the assassination attempt prompted
a high-ranking intelligence official to exclaim that if the Air Force had killed Qaddafi,
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In a nationally televised speech, Reagan attempted to justify the
attack by linking the Libyan leader to the La Belle discotheque bombing
in Berlin, which resulted in three deaths and 230 injuries. ' 3 3 Omitting a
bracketed section of the speech to be read only if the U.S. could confirm
that the Air Force had killed Qaddafi, Reagan downplayed the sudden
nature of the American action:
We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues
before resorting to the use of force, and we did. We tried quiet diplo-
macy, public condemnation, economic sanctions and demonstrations of
military force-and none succeeded.13 4
The bracketed language of the speech echoed a legal analysis prepared
by Abraham D. Sofaer, White House legal counsel, which claimed that
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter the United States had the legal
right to "strike back to prevent future attacks" by Qaddafi. His death,
therefore, would not have been unlawful under Executive Order
12,333.13 5 Sofaer's analysis was subsequently confirmed by other
Administration lawyers. These lawyers justified the strike against Qad-
dafi as a "self-defensive and preemptive military attack" and concluded
that any resulting deaths, even Qaddafi's, could not be considered ille-
gal assassinations.1 3 6
Members of Congress, responding to debate over the Libyan
attack's legality vis-i-vis the presidential ban on assassination, intro-
duced a bill on April 17, 1986, authorizing the President to apply force
in response to foreign terrorism without consulting Congress in
advance. 137 According to the New York Times, Senator Jeremiah Denton
stated that in the case of state-sponsored terrorism, the Senate bill
would authorize the assassination of a head of state personally involved
in terrorist actions. 138 Where the President could link a foreign leader
to acts of terrorism against Americans, the bill stated the assassination
ban "would be superceeded." Section 4(b) of the proposed bill gave the
President blanket authority to attack a foreign leader connected with ter-
"'I'll buy everybody lunch, and not at the Exchange,' an inexpensive Friday night
staff hangout." Id. at 22.
The Air Force's failure to assassinate Qaddafi was perceived by the military as a
fluke. A four-star general offered the only explanation: "He [Qaddafi] must have
been in the head." Id. Although the Air Force failed to kill Qaddafi, they succeeded
in killing his fifteen-month-old daughter, Hana. Id. at 19.
133. Id. at 84.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Bob Woodward & Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Targeted Qaddafi Compound After Tracing
Terror Message, WASH. PosT, Apr. 16, 1986, at Al. Libyan citizens, however, had a
different notion about the legality of President Reagan's efforts to target Qaddafi. In
the aftermath of the attack, hundreds of young men roamed Tripoli's streets shout-
ing: "Down with America! Assassins, assassins!" Qaddafi's Family "In Terror, "WASH.
PosT, Apr. 16, 1986, at Al.
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rorism against Americans, such as the terrorist attack of the LaBelle
night club, stating, "the President is authorized to undertake actions to
protect United States persons against terrorists and terrorist activity
through the use of all such anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism meas-
ures as he deems necessary."' 3 9 Ultimately, Congress failed to enact
the bill, forcing future presidents to rely on a broad construction of Arti-
cle 51 to justify assassinations of foreign leaders.1 40
By recognizing rights of Member States to self-defense against
aggressor nations, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter arguably permits the
assassination of a foreign leader in non-war situations. Although Article
51 does not expressly permit assassination, it does allow states to use
force in self-defense. Historically, presidents have cited this permissive
force to authorize assassinations against leaders who place American
lives at risk or engage in international criminal activities. Because Exec-
utive Order 12,333 fails to define either the precise dimensions of the
assassination ban or the ban's relationship to Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, presidents can cite Article 51 as authority for a purported act of
"self-defense," which in reality is the assassination of a foreign leader.
The Reagan Administration's justification of its assassination attempt on
Qaddafi as "self-defense" reveals the ease with which presidents can
shroud assassination under the cloak of Article 51 self-defense.
C. Narrow Construction of Executive Order 12,333
Construction is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that lie
beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known from and
given in the text. Conclusions which are in the spirit though not in the
letter of the text .... In the most general adaptation of the term, con-
struction signifies the representing of an entire whole from given ele-
ments by just conclusions. Thus, it is said, a few actions may sometimes
suffice to construe the whole character of a man.
J.G. Sutherland.14 '
A third loophole the President could use to evade the assassination
ban is to construe Executive Order 12,333 narrowly. Although the lan-
guage of the Order directly bans governmental employees from "engag-
ing in, or conspiring to engage in, assassination," it does not delineate
specific actions constituting such "engaging" or "conspiring." This
imprecision leaves room for a narrow construction of the order that
would curtail the restrictions placed on the President.
In 1989, the Justice Department examined the possibility of nar-
rowly construing the ban in the context of U.S.-supported coups, Time
magazine reported.14 2 Although the results of the inquiry are secret,
former C.I.A. Counsel Bruemmer publicly concluded the ban "does not
prohibit U.S. officials from encouraging and supporting a coup, even
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 311 n.8 (1891).
142. See Church, supra note 2, at 29.
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where there is a likelihood of violence and a high probability that there
will be casualties among opponents of the coup."' 143 So long as U.S.
officials do not approve specific plans for the killing of individuals,
Bruemmer found the "prohibition against assassination has not been
violated."' 4 4
The C.I.A.'s legal conclusions on narrowly construing the ban in
the context of U.S.-supported coup attempts may have contributed to
President Bush's decision to launch Operation Just Cause in 1989. The
events leading up to the actual invasion of Panama, during the regime of
Manuel Noriega, on December 19, 1989 were instigated by a failed coup
attempt on October 3, 1989.145 Noriega crushed the attempted coup by
Panamanian dissidents. While American forces stationed in Panama
took steps to block pro-Noriega reinforcements from attacking the
rebels, President Bush declined to do anything more.1 4 6 American
efforts to instigate a coup against Noriega had previously been stifled in
1988, when sharp objections from the Senate Intelligence Committee
persuaded President Reagan to abandon a plan to overthrow the Pana-
manian dictator. 14 7 During the first year of his administration, Presi-
dent Bush openly expressed concern about the tension between the
Senate and the Reagan Administration as well as about the stifling effect
it had on coup attempts against Noriega. 148
Immediately following the failed coup attempt of October 3, 1989,
C.I.A. Director William H. Webster publicly articulated President Bush's
concerns. Encouraged by the C.I.A.'s legal conclusions, Webster
argued for a "relaxation" of the past interpretation of Executive Order
12,333 that prohibited American assistance to any coup that could lead
to the death of a country's leader.' 4 9 Assuring critics that the United
States would not engage in "selective, individual assassination," Web-
ster contended that "the United States has other important overriding
concerns about security and protecting democracy in areas of the world
... and when despots take over, there has to be a means to deal with
that."'150 The Director called for rules clearly defining the C.I.A.
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145. Panama in Disorder: The 1980s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1990, at All.
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29, 1989, § 1, at 18. Mr. Herrera travelled to the U.S. and met with the C.I.A., the
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under the ban on assassinations. Id. Eventually, the Senate Intelligence Committee's
opposition to a proposed Reagan Administration plan to topple Noriega resulted in
the President completely abandoning any coup effort. Id.
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officers' authority so that "they can go right up to the edge of that
authority and not worry if they or their agency is going to get into
trouble."' 5 1 Webster perceived a willingness in the Bush Administra-
tion and Congress to reinterpret the assassination ban to give the C.I.A.
greater freedom to deal with coup planners in Panama and other places,
the New York Times reported. Revealing his conclusion, Webster com-
mented, "I think Noriega's days are numbered."'152
As Noriega's stranglehold on Panama increased and along with it
his profits from drug trafficking, President Bush became increasingly
frustrated. 15 3 The December 15 Panamanian declaration of war against
the United States and Panama's intentional killing of a U.S. Marine lieu-
tenant the next day further incited the President.'54 President Bush
acted on December 19, 1989 by ordering American military forces into
the streets of Panama in a major operation designed to topple the
Noriega government.' 55
In the days immediately following the launch of Operation Just
Cause, the Bush Administration discussed the legal authority for its
actions. In a formal statement, Secretary of State James Baker cited the
inherent right of the United States "to take measures necessary to
defend our military personnel, our United States nationals and U.S.
installations" as legal support for Operation Just Cause. 156 In addition,
Baker cited the Panamanian declaration of war and the killing of the U.S.
Marine lieutenant as providing further legal basis for the attack. In a
prior press conference, however, President Bush justified the U.S. action
by focusing on Noriega's status as an "indicted narcotics dealer." 157 In
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another press conference, President Bush dismissed the dictator's decla-
ration of war as ineffectual: "That's technical... [B]ut I've taken note of
the statement."' l5 8
President Bush's publicly expressed desire to relax restrictions
placed on him by the assassination ban in Noriega's case and the fact
that the President never declared Operation Just Cause an actual war
raise serious questions about the legitimacy of the raid on Panama.
Even if one labeled the operation a "war," the one million dollar bounty
that President Bush placed on Noriega's head may have violated the lim-
ited military prohibition against "putting a price on an enemy's
head." 159
In addition, the attack included a direct frontal assault on Noriega's
headquarters, an assault that could easily have resulted in the Panama-
nian dictator's death. Nevertheless, because Executive Order 12,333
fails to define the scope of the assassination ban, President Bush could
have argued that Operation Just Cause did not violate the ban on assas-
sinations. The attack on Noriega's headquarters could be explained as
not including "specific plans for the killing of individuals," particularly
Noriega himself. The reward could be characterized as falling short of
"putting a price on an enemy's head" and rather as a reasonable means
of securing information about the whereabouts of an international drug
trafficker. In sum, the President could say Operation Just Cause
involved not an attempted "assassination" but an attempt to address the
international drug trafficking problem, especially inasmuch as Noriega
was never harmed.
D. Presidential or Congressional Repeal or Amendment
Among the substantial objections to the great powers of the President,
that of his negative upon the laws, is one of the most inconsiderable ....
For, if he be a bold enterprising fellow, there is little fear of his ever hav-
ing to exercise it ... [If, however, I say, he should not be a man of an
enterprising spirit, in that case he will be a minion of the aristocratics,
doing according to their will and pleasure, and confirming every law they
may think proper to make.
Antifederalist Philadelphians 160
Both Congress and the President have the power either to repeal or to
amend an executive order, and Congress has repealed executive orders
on many occasions. 16 1 Thus, if the three previously discussed loopholes
in the assassination prohibition were unavailable, the President could
Noriega, Panama's Former Dictator, in Cocaine-Trafficking Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 1992,
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utive orders dealing with the Canal Zone, veterans' pensions, and veterans' salaries,
among other things).
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repeal or amend Executive Order 12,333 or permit Congress to do the
same.
The President can repeal or amend an executive order simply by
writing a new one. The President would merely have to draft a new
executive order either narrowing or contradicting Executive Order
12,333, thereby overruling it by inconsistency.16 2 Commentators argue
that such a presidential fiat provides an effective yet uncomplicated sub-
stitute for executive inability to mobilize Congress.1 6 3
The President may legitimately conceal a complete or partial repeal
of the executive ban on assassinations from the public. Although most
executive orders must be published in the Federal Register, executive
orders "not having general applicability and legal effect or effective only
against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, agents,
or employees thereof" do not have to be published by the President. 64
Because an order repealing the assassination ban would deal only with
the ability of U.S. employees or officials to engage in assassinations, the
President might not have to publish it. Moreover, one commentator has
argued that an executive order repealing Executive Order 12,333's ban
on assassinations might also be deemed classified information because it
concerns "intelligence activities . . . or intelligence sources and meth-
ods" pursuant to Executive Order 12,356.165
If the President believes the particular situation he is confronting is
legally insufficient to support the assassination of a foreign leader,
whether by war, self-defense, or narrow construction of the assassina-
tion ban, he may create a temporary exception to the ban by partially
repealing Executive Order 12,333. Because the assassination prohibi-
tion is presidential legislation in the intelligence area, a president has
the exclusive power to dismiss the ban secretly whenever he believes a
dismissal is warranted. 166
IV. Application: The Persian Gulf War
Although Executive Order 12,333 states that "[n]o person employed by
or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or
conspire to engage in, assassination," the prohibition is far from abso-
lute. Applying the four loopholes to the events of the Persian Gulf War
reveals the dimensions of these loopholes. By exploiting the loopholes,
President Bush could have legally justified Saddam Hussein's assassina-
tion at any point in the conflict, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, to the U.S. attack on Baghdad on January 16, 1991.
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A. Invasion of Kuwait: August 1990
On Thursday, August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwaiti border
and penetrated Kuwait's capital city. 167 Kuwaiti officials quickly rebuf-
fed initial statements by Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein that his troops
were assisting Kuwaiti revolutionaries in overthrowing the Kuwaiti Gov-
ernment. 168 The United States condemned the invasion, and the White
House called for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces." 16 9 The U.N. Security Council immediately met to draft a
resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion. 170 Raising the possibility of
economic or military action in a news conference with Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of Britain, President Bush called the invasion an
exercise of "naked aggression" and sought to enlist world leaders in
collective action against Iraq.' 7 1 Both leaders cited Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter as legal authority for such action. 172 Previously, the Bush
Administration revealed a less specific commitment to defend Kuwait
under Article 51 when the President stated, "[w]e remain strongly com-
mitted to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our
friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and longlasting ties." 17 3
Although the United States did not formally declare war on Iraq
upon the August invasion of Kuwait, commentators argue that the U.S.
assassination of Saddam Hussein immediately after the invasion would
not have violated Executive Order 12,333.174 Abraham Sofaer and
other analysts argue that a broad reading of Article 51 could legitimate
such an assassination.1 75 According to Sofaer, Article 51 recognizes the
right of self-defense against armed attack not only for the victim nation
but also for others coming to its aid.' 76 Based on Kuwait's repeated
pleas to the United States for help, the U.S., buttressed by the U.N.
Security Council's resolution condemning Iraq's invasion, could legiti-
mately attack Iraq and seek to kill the commander-in-chief, Saddam
Hussein. 177
As this Note has argued in Section III, this interpretation of the
U.N. Charter is tenable. By labelling Saddam's assassination as one
facet of a self-defense effort on behalf of the victim nation Kuwait, Presi-
dent Bush could have rendered the conflict sufficiently war-like to justify
attacking one of the enemy, namely the military leader. 178 Moreover, by
167. Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. R.W. Apple, Jr., Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; U.S. Condemns Attack,
Urges United Action, "Naked Aggression", N.Y. TMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al.
172. Id.
173. See Gordon, supra note 167, at A8.
174. See Church, supra note 2, at 29.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
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narrowly construing Executive Order 12,333, President Bush could have
authorized killing Saddam and claimed that the leader was not specifi-
cally targeted, but in the wrong place at the wrong time. 17 9 Finally,
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait could have compelled President Bush secretly
to amend or repeal the assassination prohibition.18 0 Thus, though no
American hostages were formally taken, and the United States was more
than three months away from taking military action against Iraq, the de
minimus legal restrictions of Executive Order 12,333 would not have
prohibited President Bush from ordering Saddam Hussein's assassina-
tion on August 2, 1990.
B. The Taking of American Hostages: October 1990
A week after the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein told foreign gov-
ernments that embassies in occupied Kuwait City must close by August
24. At the same time, Saddam prevented 3500 Americans, and
thousands of other foreigners, from leaving either Kuwait or Iraq.
Despite Saddam's initial refusal to label the 3500 Americans "hos-
tages,"1 8 1 the United States quickly discovered that these individuals
were held against their will. Although Saddam subsequently permitted
Western women and children to leave, about 1000 Western men were
located around Iraqi military bases and other strategic sites as "human
shields" against any attack by the anti-Iraq allies.' 8 2 Assessing the
plight of these "human shields," President Frangois Mitterand of France
commented, "[w]hat's going on here is gangsterism, plain and sim-
ple." 183 Just over a week after Mitterand's statement, Saddam released
all the French hostages.1 8 4 After his release, one French hostage
reported that American hostages were being treated especially poorly.
"They were only allowed out two hours a day. We couldn't count them
or approach them. Plainclothes police controlled everything."' 8 5 Label-
ling this treatment "unconscionable," Secretary of State Baker cited the
cutting of food rations and the filthiness of concrete floors on which
Americans slept as further indications of Saddam's mistreatment of the
hostages. 18 6
Saddam Hussein's taking of American hostages would have pro-
vided further legal justification for the assassination of the Iraqi leader.
With American hostages in Iraq, President Bush could have justified
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Saddam's assassination as both an attempt to defend Kuwait and an
effort to protect innocent Americans held against their will.18 7 The
detention of American hostages in Iraq would also demonstrate the war-
like nature of the conflict between Iraq and the United States, thereby
justifying an attack on the enemy's commander-in-chief.18 8 In addition,
President Bush could again employ a narrow construction of Executive
Order 12,333 or a secret repeal or amendment of it to legalize Saddam
Hussein's assassination. 189 Regardless of available diplomatic measures
to secure the release of American hostages, and despite the absence of a
declaration of war on Iraq, Executive Order 12,333 would not have
restricted President Bush from ordering the assassination of Saddam in
October 1990.
C. The U.N. Security Council and Congressional Resolutions
Authorizing the Use of Force: November-December 1990
While Saddam Hussein ultimately decided to release all foreign hos-
tages, tensions between the United States and its allies and Iraq contin-
ued to build. As one diplomat stated, "[t]he release of the hostages
doesn't alter the fact that the stage is still set for a bloody showdown
.... Iraq has given no sign it is prepared to leave Kuwait; quite the
opposite."' 9 0 Despite Saddam's decision to release all hostages, the
Bush Administration began courting U.N. Security Council Members
regarding a proposed resolution authorizing the use of force by Member
Nations if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. After
a whirlwind international diplomatic mission by Secretary of State
Baker, the U.N. Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 678 authoriz-
ing the use of force against Iraq if Saddam did not withdraw by January
15.191 Responding to discontent surrounding an apparently inevitable
war, President Bush assured Americans,
I will do my level best to bring those kids home without one single shot
being fired in anger... [A]nd if a shot is fired in anger, I want to guaran-
tee each person that their kid whose life is in harm's way will have the
maximum support, will have the best chance to come home alive, and will
be backed up to the hilt. 192
Despite an initial reluctance to pass a resolution similar to U.N. Resolu-
tion 678, Congress eventually accepted the President's guarantee and
on January 14 authorized the President to make use of American forces
pursuant to U.N. resolutions if he determined that military force was
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necessary. 193
The resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council and the U.S.
Congress further legitimized an American assassination attempt against
Saddam Hussein. By sanctioning the use of military force after January
15, the U.N. Security Council resolution effectively permitted the United
States and other allied nations to attack Iraq. The resolutions passed by
Congress served a similar purpose, giving congressional authorization
for military action. By allowing the United States to enter into a military
conflict with Iraq subsequent to January 15, these two resolutions per-
mitted President Bush to consider Iraqis, including Saddam Hussein,
the commander-in-chief, belligerents susceptible to intentional killing.
Without putting a single allied serviceman directly at risk by formally
declaring war, these resolutions removed any legal obstacle that Execu-
tive Order 12,333 placed on Saddam's assassination.
D. Authorizing Military Action Against Iraq: January 1991
On January 16, 1991, President Bush proclaimed that military action
would begin against Iraq. 194 After the announcement, congressional
leaders united behind the President. House Speaker Thomas Foley,
who had opposed a resolution authorizing military action, declared,
"[w]e must now pray for a conflict that ends quickly .... [W]e must now
stand united in support of our armed forces in the Gulf."195 Senator
David Boren, a staunch opponent of a war resolution, commented,
"[y]ou'll see Congress come together and offer virtually unanimous sup-
port for the troops and give them the resources that are necessary to
keep the war as short as possible and the casualties at a minimum."1 9 6
By effectively declaring war against Iraq, President Bush enhanced
the legality of assassinating Saddam Hussein. As the commander-in-
chief of the Iraqi armed forces, Saddam could be considered a belliger-
ent whose assassination was permitted by military law. 19 7 As long as
President Bush did not "put a price" on Saddam's head, he could carry
out a wartime assassination without violating Executive Order
12,333.198 Representative Dana Rohrabacher apparently reached the
same conclusion when he said,
Saddam is getting exactly what he asked for .... I hope that we find out
where Saddam Hussein is early on in the conflict, and, if we do, it will be a
much shorter conflict. It's clear our fight isn't with the people of Iraq; it's
with this megalomaniac who has forced this fight upon us.1 99
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Thus, at each of these four stages in the American-Iraqi conflict,
President Bush could have ordered Saddam Hussein's assassination
without violating Executive Order 12,333. By broadly construing Arti-
cle 51, narrowly construing the assassinations ban, and commencing war
against Iraq, President Bush could have legally justified Saddam's assas-
sination. Regardless of the number of American lives at stake, the pres-
ence of American troops in the region, and the existence of a
congressional authorization to wage war against Iraq, President Bush
could legally have ordered Saddam's assassination at any time after the
invasion of Kuwait. It is disturbing that assassination might have accom-
plished the President's four goals in the conflict with Iraq: freeing the
hostages, securing complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait, restoring Kuwait's government, and stabilizing the gulf
region. 20 0 Saddam Hussein, who ironically participated himself in an
assassination plot against a previous Iraqi dictator,20 1 was a legal target
for an American assassination throughout his confrontation with the
United States. American law would have permitted President Bush to
use the same tactic that Saddam Hussein employed at the beginning of
his brutal political career. 20 2
V. A Call for Comprehensive Congressional Action
Although Executive Order 12,333 bans assassination, the prohibition's
practical effect is to place minimal restrictions on a president bent on
assassinating a foreign leader. Comprehensive congressional legislation
is needed to address the ban's loopholes.
In light of the political realities dominating congressional attempts
to adopt a comprehensive ban on assassination, a political pragmatist
might be inclined to argue for a congressional ban with certain excep-
tions. For example, a ban containing military exceptions that allow
assassinations with a military objective might be more palatable to reluc-
tant members of Congress. A ban with exceptions, however, would
200. Terry Atlas, Hostages May Be Coming Home, But Bush Faces a Risky Period, CHI-
CAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 9, 1990, at 12.
201. After the assassination attempt failed, Saddam escaped by cutting a bullet out
of his leg with a penknife and fleeing 300 miles across the desert on a donkey. Elaine
Sciolino, Arab of Vast Ambition, Saddam Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, § 1, at 14.
202. Some American lawmakers were apparently unaware of the four loopholes in
Executive Order 12,333 at the time of the Gulf War. OnJanuary 17, 1991, Represen-
tative McEwen introduced a resolution that expressed congressional support for the
suspension of the prohibition against assassination in Executive Order 12,333 until
Iraq had fully complied with all applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions. Justify-
ing his resolution, Representative McEwen explained, "[t]here is an executive order
that prevents us from targeting the sources of the attack upon the American forces.
Mr. Speaker, that might make sense at the Kennedy School of Government, but to
the average common sense of the taxpayer of southern Ohio it is foolish.... In this
trying time, those military planners, those secretaries of defense, those commanders
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allow American officials to use assassination as a policy device. Inevita-
bly, such a ban would be vulnerable to the same abuses that Executive
Order 12,333 currently encourages.
Only comprehensive congressional legislation can effectively
remove the loopholes piercing Executive Order 12,333. First, such leg-
islation could preclude "assassination" at all times, including wartime,
thereby preventing a declaration of war legitimating a premeditated kill-
ing of a foreign leader. Second, the legislation could clarify the relation-
ship between the ban and the privilege of self-defense articulated in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In particular, the statute could
provide that an international right to self-defense is not sufficient to
legalize assassination of a foreign leader. Third, in debating the statute,
Congress could generate legislative history sufficient to prevent any
presidential attempts narrowly to construe the ban. Congress could
articulate in the committee reports, for example, that the ban covers
assassination attempts shrouded under the cloak of legitimate military
maneuvers. Finally, because congressional action would be statutory, a
president would be unable to repeal or amend the prohibition. Any
alterations to the comprehensive ban would require Congress's
approval and subsequently the President's authorization.
Conclusion
In 1976, President Gerald Ford outlined the first official American ban
on assassinations in Executive Order 11,905.203 While three successive
presidents have affirmed the prohibition against government involve-
ment in assassination, Congress has failed numerous times to legislate a
ban on such activities.20 4 Without congressional action, the sole obsta-
cle to a U.S. assassination of a foreign leader is the current presidential
prohibition enshrined in Executive Order 12,333. As presidential legis-
lation, however, Executive Order 12,333 is more of a nuisance than a
barrier to a president bent on assassinating a foreign leader.
Because the ban on assassinations is articulated in an executive
order rather than an act of Congress, numerous methods circumventing
the prohibition exist. Besides the four methods enumerated in this
Note, many more legal arguments may be available to avid administra-
tion lawyers seeking to justify a foreign official's slaying. Without con-
gressional action comprehensively outlawing assassination and
specifying the nature of restraints placed on a president, assassination
will remain a policy option for future administrations.
Any assassination involves serious moral questions. One could
argue that assassinating Manuel Noriega, Muammar el-Qaddafi, and
Saddam Hussein would be justified because the assassination would save
203. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1971-1975). "[§ 5(g)] No employee of
the United States government shall engage in, or conspire in, political assassination."
id. at 101.
204. See supra notes 46-74 and accompanying text.
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lives. Utilitarian analysis, however, cannot avoid the reality that assassi-
nation is a brutal, cowardly, and inhuman act. Noble ends cannot justify
the brutality of assassination. Shakespeare understood the horror of
such means and forced Macbeth to face the assassinated Banquo. Real-
izing the atrocity he committed, Macbeth cried,
If Charnell houses, and our Graves must send
Those that we bury, backe; our Monuments
Shall be the Mawes of Kytes. 20 5
The recent Gulf War highlights the grave inadequacy of the U.S.
ban on assassination. Although President Bush assured the interna-
tional community that the United States never targeted Saddam Hus-
sein,20 6 a careful analysis of Executive Order 12,333's application
reveals the President had the legal authority to assassinate Saddam at
every stage in the conflict. President Bush justified the war with Iraq as
an effort to ensure that the Middle East be governed by the "rule of
law," not by the "law of thejungle. '20 7 Any system operating under the
"rule of law," however, should not permit assassination of foreign offi-
cials under any circumstances.
Even under a pragmatic view, a policy condoning assassination is
unsound. Any assassination effort creates the risk of retaliation from the
targeted individual and his supporters. An American initiative to assas-
sinate a foreign leader could result in similar initiatives by the targeted
leader's nation against American officials. Moreover, given the world's
delicate diplomatic balance, other nations might perceive any American
assassination effort as an illegitimate act warranting retaliation.
Notwithstanding the pragmatic ramifications of assassination, the
United States must not adopt the tactics of barbarians and terrorists. It
is for terrorists alone to justify their brutal means with allegedly legiti-
mate ends, and not for a nation founded on equality and democracy.
The current executive order prohibiting U.S. assassinations is ill-advised
because it fails to deny the President the policy option of assassination.
Executive Order 12,333's prohibition against assassination leaves
too many questions unanswered and too many loopholes available.
Congressional legislation must solve these pressing problems. In 1975,
the Senate Committee investigating assassination plots of the 1950s and
1960s had similar sentiments, but expressed a continued faith in the
strength of deep-rooted American ideals:
205. See MACBETH, supra note 1, Act III, scene iv, 1. 82-84.
206. Eric L. Chase, Should We Kill Saddam, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1991, at 16. Presi-
dent Bush stated, "[wle're not in the business of targeting Saddam Hussein, [but] no
one will weep when he's gone .... There would be no sorrow if he's not there." Id.
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attack on an "appropriately anonymous objective," such as a command-and-commu-
nications bunker. Id.
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The United States must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as
important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints
that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use
are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is less-
ened. Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in
this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear
the story and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront
our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will
decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past.
20 8
While the embarrassment of over fifteen years of congressional silence
on the issue of assassination may dampen the "great faith" a person has
in this country, Americans must press their representatives to legitimize
America's conflicts with dictators, drug traffickers, and terrorists by
comprehensively outlawing the illegitimate means used by enemies of
the United States.
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